The pro-poor gap evaluation by Nguyen, Tung Nhu
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Asian Management Insights Centre for Management Practice
5-2018
The pro-poor gap evaluation
Tung Nhu Nguyen
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/ami
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
This Magazine Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Management Practice at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Asian Management Insights by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
Nguyen, Tung Nhu. The pro-poor gap evaluation. (2018). Asian Management Insights. 5, (1), 24-29. Asian Management Insights.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/ami/78
INDUSTRY WATCH
Improving the future design and 
implementation of public-private partnerships.
By Tung Nhu Nguyen
Between 2004 and 2012, investment 
in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in 
developing countries increased nearly 
six-fold, from US$24.4 billion to 
US$144 billion, after which, there was a 
dip for two years before it bounced back 
to US$120.2 billion in 2015 (Romero 
DQG 9HUY\QFNW  6XFK VLJQLÀFDQW
increases call for the need to measure 
the performance and contributions of 
these investments. In doing so, identifying 
the factors behind their successes and 
failures can provide essential lessons 
for improving the future design and 
implementation of these partnerships. 
PPPs are often thought of as projects 
with social goals and private expertise, 
such as investments in infrastructure 
facilities for public goods with universal 
entitlement, irrespective of the ability 
to pay. Thus, even more so, social goals 
QHHG WR EH NHSW LQ PLQG ZKHQ GHÀQLQJ
and measuring their performance. 
Pro-poor objective of PPPs
One of the central goals of the World 
Bank Group is to fight poverty and the 
PPP initiatives it supports need to be 
aligned with this strategic social goal. 
However, PPP projects, in general, tend 
to focus more on economic development 
through infrastructure growth rather 
than on poverty reduction. When an 
economy grows in parallel with falling 
poverty rates, economists call it ‘pro-
poor growth’. Development experts hold 
that PPP initiatives must have benefits, 
outcomes and welfare distribution 
channels that are pro-poor. For example, 
PPP performance indicators state that 
pro-poor PPP projects should display 
an increase in connectivity or access 
for poorer areas, include piped water 
or electricity projects, improve access 
to health services such as medical clinics, 
enhance public transport facilities, 
or contribute to the development of 
economic zones. 
The Independent Evaluation Group 
(IEG) to the World Bank Group issues 
an important evaluation report that 
underpins support for PPPs. Its reports 
for the 10 years leading up to 2012 
provide reviews for PPP interventions 
around the world, after which they seek 
to provide recommendations to the 
World Bank Group, including the 
International Financial Corporation 
(IFC) and the Multi-lateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Among 
other tasks, the evaluation teams provide 
project-level assessments of individual 
PPP projects. 
In its 2015 report, the IEG stated 
that, under its new strategy, the World 
Bank Group intends to work with the 
public and private sectors to end extreme 
poverty and promote shared prosperity. 
333VÀQDQFHGE\ WKH:RUOG%DQN*URXS
must thus include pro-poor objectives 
of providing infrastructure or services. 
Project-level monitoring and evaluation 
systems must be properly designed to 
include this target as a measurement 
for a project’s success. 
Pro-poor data scarcity
Different evaluation systems are used 
around the world to measure the 
performance of PPP investments. 
Their focal point is whether or not 
individual investments are able to record 
their achievements in addressing the 
concerns of stakeholders, including 
SRRU EHQHÀFLDULHV
Meanwhile, in its 2014 report 
titled, ‘World Bank Group Support to 
Public-Private Partnerships’, the IEG 
acknowledged that there was a big gap 
in monitoring and evaluating pro-poor 
data. The available numbers are mainly financial performance indicators, including 
those used for cash flow estimation, while there is a paucity of data for 
RWKHU 333 VXFFHVV GLPHQVLRQV VXFK DV SURSRRU DVSHFWV DQG ÀVFDO HIIHFWV $OWKRXJK 
the central goals of the World Bank are to fight poverty and promote prosperity, 
PPP internal audit teams have emphasised financial performance as 
a PPP project success indicator and have seemingly forgotten that PPP projects in 
developing countries should be for the poor.
Figure 1 shows PPP projects supported by the World Bank, IFC and MIGA, 
together with data on the available results. Disappointingly, out of a total of 
 333V VXSSRUWHG DFURVV WKH WKUHH RUJDQLVDWLRQV QRQH RIIHU GDWD IRU DOO ÀQDQFLDO 
and social) dimensions. Meanwhile, there are less than 10 PPPs, or 8 percent of 
the total, with available data on pro-poor dimensions. This ratio is too small to 
determine whether the Bank is meeting its strategic goal of assisting the poor. 
Furthermore, in the IEG Report, 22 PPP cases were selected for an in-depth 
assessment to measure their social performance indicators. These PPPs are located 
LQWKUHHUHJLRQDOFOXVWHUV/DWLQ$PHULFD%UD]LO&RORPELD*XDWHPDOD(DVW$VLD3DFLÀF
(China, the Philippines, Vietnam) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Senegal, Uganda). 
This assessment showed that the measures for pro-poor performance indicators for 
water and transport PPPs (i.e. access for the poor or high coverage in poor areas) 
DUH VLJQLÀFDQWO\ KLJK
A rare pro-poor case study: The Philippines
Among the rare cases of addressing pro-poor objectives, the IEG report noted 
several initiatives in the Philippines that had benefited the poor. The field of 
development interventions in the country included improved water connections, 
AVAILABILITY OF PRO-POOR RESULTS DATA FOR  
WORLD BANK GROUP-SUPPORTED PPPs
IFC  
investments
IFC  
advisory services
MIGA
guarantees
World Bank
loans/*PRGs
Total number of PPP projects 147 105 62 128
Of these, number of operationally matured/
closed PPPs (and for World Bank loans 
classified as ‘major’) 99 n.a. 47 27
PPPs with results data—at least one dimension 60 6 12 20
PPPs with results data—all dimensions 0 0 0 0
Access 50 5 6 14
Pro-poor 5 0 1 3
Quality 14 2 3 10
Efficiency 17 3 3 8
Financial 43 1 4 6
Fiscal 6 3 2 1
Note:  For IFC advisory services, data is based on the six available post-completion reports on PPPs.
*PRGs = Partial risk guarantees.
FIGURE 1 Source: IEG Report (2015)
There is a paucity of 
data for public-private 
partnership success 
dimensions such as  
pro-poor aspects and 
fiscal effects.
PRO-POOR EXPERIENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
PPP Project Pro-poor indicator How to support the poor
Water Increase in 
connections  
in poor areas
The World Bank Group’s Global Partnership for Output-based Aid 
undertook a pilot with Manila Water Company to provide water 
connections for 28,000 households. The grant of US$2.8 million 
provided connections at an individual cost of about Php 2,476 
(US$47.53), of which the householder was responsible for about 
Php 600 (US$11.52), which could be paid in instalments.
Transport Bus share  
of traffic
To stimulate access by the poor to the highway, the expressway 
company designed a toll for mini passenger buses (jeepneys) at a 
flat daily rate. 
Electricity Increase 
connections  
in poor areas
The government subsidises electricity rates, as a result of IFC 
advice in the context of privatisation, by keeping them at a fixed 
level and paying the difference to the generator. 
Exchange rate of US$1 = Php 52.09 as of February 2018.
FIGURE 2 Source: IEG Report (2015)
electricity connections and transport participation, which required some funds 
contributed by users. The interesting features of the PPP cases in the Philippines 
include the fact that the poor not only received subsidised access to PPP 
infrastructure, but were also presented with other affordable options. For example, 
minibuses, which are convenient for picking up and dropping off passengers, enjoy 
a cheaper daily flat rate for using the PPP highway compared to bigger vehicles, 
which made it more affordable for poor commuters. As a result, the share of minibuses 
traffic steadily increased from 0.9 percent in 2004 to 7 percent in 2010. For 
electricity PPP projects, poorer households were given the choice of geothermal, 
thermal and hydro-power generation, all subsidised by the government, for 
water supply, a pilot PPP project subsidised the connection fees, which helped to 
raise connection rates in poorer areas, and this model has been planned for 
replication (refer to Figure 2).
Challenges with pro-poor projects in Ghana
Implementing a pro-poor PPP project in Ghana revealed a conundrum for the 
private sector. On the one hand, the private investor was attracted to developing 
public infrastructure with purely profit incentives and focused on formulating 
a pricing structure where tariffs were set at a price high enough to recover the 
initial investment and bring in subsequent positive income. On the other hand, 
it was under pressure not to increase the financial burden for the poor. In fact, 
social movements in Ghana such as the NGO Integrated Social Development 
Centre worked with the Coalition Against the Privatization of Water in Ghana to 
carry out anti-PPP campaigns. As a consequence, private investor Ghana Company 
Water Limited had to set a low tariff of 31 cents per cubic metre, much less than its 
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initially proposed 70 cents per 
cubic metre to financially recover the 
investment as projected. The income 
from tariffs collected was so inadequate 
that it was financially unhealthy and, 
noted Fuesta and Haffnerb (2007), “it 
survived only by means of considerable 
government subsidies.” Meanwhile 
Lobina and Hall (2003) observed 
that a private company with a thoroughly 
profit  motive f inds it ,  “…very 
difficult to reconcile with service 
delivery to the poor without substantial 
public subsidy.” 
Why is pro-poor  
data scarce?
Evaluation experts at individual PPPs 
must have known of the social objective 
to include the poor. It is not difficult 
for PPP teams to record data on 
how many poor households are included 
in the pool of beneficiary households, 
and are connected with piped water 
systems or electricity grids funded 
by the project, and then to include this 
ratio in evaluation reports. But most of 
them, as compiled in the IEG report, 
did not do so. There are several 
MXVWLÀFDWLRQV IRU ZK\ WKLV LV VR
First is the ‘disconnect’ between 
objectives and practice. While these 
objectives have been set by the World 
Bank, in practice, teams struggle with 
such objectives. For example, rural PPP 
piped water use entails connection costs 
and periodic tariffs. Due to the limited 
budget, local grants may pilot funding 
for just a small number of connections 
with a discount in the project’s first 
year, but not for total costs and monthly 
tariffs (e.g. the Philippines water PPP 
case). Poverty coverage is therefore low, 
and may become lower as connected 
households abandon piped water to avoid 
monthly tariffs. But evaluators do not want 
to see a decrease in the  number of poor 
beneficiaries in their reports. One 
possible solution is to plan tariffs 
differently for different income groups. 
For example, the very poor should be 
exempted from or charged a very low 
tariff to stimulate water usage. 
Second is the issue of being 
‘solution-based’ and not ‘problem-
based’. Development designers stick to 
a solution, which is possibly successful 
in one context and want to replicate it 
in all contexts. In fact, each context is 
characterised by individual complexities 
that require a matching solution. 
Teams may come to a locality with 
the idea of addressing the ‘lack of 
tap (piped) water’, for example. 
The truth is that ‘tap water’ is 
not a problem, but is just one of 
several options used to resolve the 
problem of health or more specifically, 
water-borne diseases. Practitioners 
can select the best option to address 
this problem in a way that is affordable, 
feasible and the most impactful for 
local people. 
For example, sparsely populated 
areas are normally not financially and 
technologically suitable for building a 
water pipeline. If the policy or water 
use master plan is to popularise tap 
water everywhere, including  sparsely 
populated areas, on the pretext of 
modernising rural locations, connection 
rates may not be high as expected, 
as financially struggling households 
may use their limited resources for 
other priorities, such as their children’s 
education or healthcare services. More 
evidence is needed to support the 
relationship between the use of tap 
water and reduction in occurrence of 
water-borne diseases, such as diarrhoea. 
It is generally claimed that diarrhoea 
is also due to unhygienic eating and 
drinking behaviour. 
Third, in the PPP implementation 
process, there may be stakeholders that 
are considered more important than 
the poor beneficiaries. For instance, 
private investors are very interested 
in the profitability of a PPP project. 
Specifically, they would like to know 
how many households are willing to 
pay for connections and tariffs so 
that they know when a project would 
pay back their initial investment 
capital. They may be concerned if there 
are many households without the 
capacity to pay. Freeman and McVea 
(1984) suggest a two-variable framework 
consisting of stakeholders’ interests and 
power, which holds that a stakeholder 
with strong authority or power and 
a high level of interest in the 
project outcomes requires them “to 
[be] manage[d] closely”. 
Private investors have a strong 
voice because their decision determines 
whether or not the project is funded. 
Therefore, PPP projects may struggle 
or may not want to report the number 
of households without the capacity 
to pay, unless there are guaranteed 
sources of grants for them (as in the case 
of the piped water PPP in the 
Philippines). This hesitation may 
lead to the exclusion of pro-poor 
indicators, which means evaluation 
reports will miss this data.
Development designers stick to a solution, which 
may be replicated in all contexts. However, each 
context has individual complexities that require a 
matching solution.
In summary, it is conventionally believed that public infrastructure 
facilities are public goods rather than commercial goods and everyone is 
entitled to use them. The World Bank Group strategy states that PPP 
beneficiaries should include the poor who have difficulty paying for those 
VHUYLFHV7KLV SUHVHQWV D SRWHQWLDO FRQÁLFW RI LQWHUHVWZLWKSULYDWH LQYHVWRUVZKR VHHN 
ÀQDQFLDOUHWXUQV IURPXVHUV(YHQVRVHYHUDORSWLRQVDUHDYDLODEOH WRWDFNOH WKLVFKDOOHQJH 
Private companies may follow corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices 
including subsidising and providing grants to the poor. The design of monitoring 
DQG HYDOXDWLRQ V\VWHPV FDQ DOVR DOORZ IRU VRPHÁH[LELOLW\ LQ UHFRUGLQJSURSRRU GDWD 
depending on local conditions. Sources of pro-poor data may also come from private 
sector CSR reports, not necessarily from project records. Nevertheless, any PPP will 
need to set up a monitoring and evaluation system to make a comprehensive 
assessment of PPP project success, including the pro-poor aspects. Without 
them, PPP results will not be completely aligned with the World Bank Group’s 
strategy for the poor, nor with the many NGOs that keep asking the Bank 
to meet this social objective.
The World Bank Group strategy states that public-
private partnership beneficiaries should include the 
poor who have difficulty paying for services. This 
presents a potential conflict of interest with private 
investors who seek financial returns from users.
Tung Nhu Nguyen 
is a Lecturer in the School of Business at International University, in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
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